Is human object recognition viewpoint dependent or viewpoint i n v ariant under everyday" conditions? Biederman and Gerhardstein 1993 argue that viewpoint-invariant mechanisms are used almost exclusively. H o w ever, our analysis indicates that: 1 their conditions for immediate viewpoint i n v ariance lack the generality t o c haracterize a wide range of recognition phenomena; 2 the extensive body of viewpoint-dependent results cannot be dismissed as processing by-products" or experimental artifacts"; 3 geon structural descriptions cannot coherently account for category recognition, the domain they are intended to explain. We conclude that the weight of current evidence supports an exemplar-based multiple-views mechanism as an important component of both exemplar-speci c and categorical recognition.
In their recent paper Recognizing depth-rotated objects: Evidence and conditions for three-dimensional viewpoint i n v ariance," Biederman and Gerhardstein 1993 test viewpointinvariant and viewpoint-dependent theories of human object recognition. What di erentiates these theories are their predictions concerning recognition performance following a change in viewpoint. Because both viewpoint-dependent and viewpoint-invariant patterns have been observed under a variety of experimental conditions B ultho & Edelman, 1992; Corballis, 1988; Jolicoeur, 1985; 1990a , 1990b Srinivas, 1993; Tarr, in press; Tarr & Pinker, 1989; , it is not the existence of either pattern per se that supports one class of theories over the other. Rather, it is how theorists interpret the relative importance and ecological validity of speci c experimental conditions. Only when results are perceived as having generalizability to normal" object recognition can claims be made concerning the wider explanatory power of a given class of mechanisms. For instance, perform the following Gedanken Experiment: Given a set of di erently colored objects red, green, blue..., imagine them presented one at a time, with your task being simply to recognize each individual object." Performance in such a task would almost certainly be invariant over viewpoint, size, mirror-re ection, and many other transformations. Yet, as soon as additional similarly-colored objects are introduced into the set, recognition based solely on color becomes impossible. Such is the case if this set of colored objects are considered in the context of the objects we routinely distinguish in the real world." Simply put, because no color is unique or diagnostic for any single object or category, such a result should not be used to make generalizations about object recognition.
Biederman and Gerhardstein use a similar argument to claim that a particular version of viewpoint-invariant recognition, that utilizing geon structural descriptions" GSDs, provides an exclusive account o f e v eryday h uman object recognition. GSD theory assumes that the approximate shape of objects is represented by con gurations of recovered threedimensional parts geons. The innovation of GSD theory is its use of combinations of nonaccidental" properties e.g., parallel lines or collinear line segments as the basis for the recovery of parts. Because combinations of non-accidental properties are presumed to be viewpoint i n v ariant, recovered GSDs exhibit restricted viewpoint i n v ariance as long as the same combinations are visible, they lead to the same part description. Such viewpoint-invariance is the fundamental prediction of GSD theory tested by Biederman and Gerhardstein. 1 1 Other kinds of invariance have been observed, for instance over size or mirror-re ection Biederman & The major failure of the GSD approach is its inability to account for the extensive n umber of psychophysical studies that have revealed viewpoint-dependent recognition performance e.g., Bartram, 1974; Farah, Rochlin, & Klein, 1994; Humphrey & Khan, 1992; Jolicoeur, 1985 Jolicoeur, , 1990a Jolicoeur, , 1990b Logothetis, Pauls, B ultho , & Poggio, 1994; Palmer, Rosch, & Chase, 1981; Perrett, et. al., 1989; Rock & Di Vita, 1987; Srinivas, 1993; Tarr, in press; Tarr & Pinker, 1989 . To address and discount this body of data, Biederman and Gerhardstein 1993 argue that essentially all studies that provide evidence for viewpoint-dependent recognition mechanisms violate at least one of three conditions that they believe are typical of everyday object recognition. These conditions are: 1 objects must be decomposable into parts e.g., the objects in Figure 1 ; 2 objects to be di erentiated must have di erent part descriptions e.g., either Figure 1a or 1b alone, but not the combination of the two; 3 two viewpoints must lead to the same con guration of geons. They claim that satisfaction of these conditions will result in performance that is immediately viewpoint i n v ariant.
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The alternative to this claim is to provide a theory of recognition and representation that accounts for viewpoint-dependent performance. Indeed, several versions of the multipleviews" theory of object recognition for details see, B ultho & Edelman, 1992; Tarr, in press; Tarr & Pinker, 1989 have been proposed as explanations. In the multiple-views approach object representations are collections of views that depict the appearance of objects from speci c viewpoints. Viewpoint-speci c percepts are normalized to one of several stored views that comprise the complete representation of the object or class. Recognition performance is viewpoint dependent because both recognition time and accuracy vary with the degree of mismatch b e t w een the percept and target view. However, because represented views may be distributed so as to minimize any normalization, nearequivalent performance may be obtained for both familiar and unfamiliar viewpoints, thereby producing viewpoint-invariant performance Logothetis, 1994; Tarr, in press; Tarr & Pinker, Cooper, 1991 Cooper, Schacter, Ballesteros, & Moore, 1992 . However, because such transformations preserve image features, it is often assumed that viewpoint i n v ariance over rotations in depth provides the crucial test between multiple-views theories and structural descriptions e.g., Corballis, 1988 . Our paper, as an analysis of Biederman and Gerhardstein's, focuses on the central issue of viewpoint.
1989. Multiple-views theories are not proposed as complete accounts of human recognition. Rather, viewpoint-dependent normalization mechanisms predominate when discriminating between visually similar objects and viewpoint-invariant mechanisms may predominate when discriminating between visually dissimilar object classes see also, Edelman, 1991; Jolicoeur, 1990a . The importance this approach to object recognition places on viewpoint-dependent results is at odds with the marginalized view of these e ects as presented in GSD theory. Therefore, we e v aluate Biederman and Gerhardstein's experimental results and their conditions for viewpoint i n v ariance in terms of three issues:
1. Generality of GSD theory. Biederman and Gerhardstein suggest that their three conditions for obtaining immediate viewpoint i n v ariance characterize the majority o f recognition judgments humans typically make. In response, we propose that these conditions lead, as in our recognition-by-color Gedanken Experiment, to a behaviorally valid, but contextually limited, characterization of recognition. Speci cally, these conditions do not form a general account o f e v eryday object recognition because they cannot be distinguished from the limited cases where features uniquely specify identity or class. Beyond such instances, the large majority of psychophysical evidence indicates that viewpoint-dependent mechanisms are used.
2. Current evidence on object recognition. Biederman and Gerhardstein suggest that all studies demonstrating viewpoint dependence fail to satisfy one or more of their conditions for immediate viewpoint i n v ariance. In response, we review some of the many recognition experiments that provide converging evidence for multiple-views. Biederman and Gerhardstein attempt to discount such evidence on the basis of speculations with little empirical support. In particular, there is little evidence to support their claims that recognition tasks exhibiting viewpoint dependence as opposed to motor tasks or mirror-image discrimination do so because of the in uence of nonrecognition systems, explicit familiarity, reliance on handedness-speci c information, or averaging across di erent qualitative views. There are studies that have examined several of these alternatives, yet still nd viewpoint-dependent performance. Moreover, these studies are not simple variants of a single paradigm, but use a wide variety o f novel and familiar objects and address many speci cs of view-based recognition and representation. For example, recent w ork has investigated how views are learned over experience Tarr, in press; Pinker, 1989 and how views generalize to novel viewpoints B ultho & Edelman, 1992; . Such studies give testimony to the fundamental importance of multiple-views in recognition.
3. Explanatory power for entry-level recognition. Biederman and Gerhardstein suggest that GSD theory is an account o f e n try-level recognition performance, that is, the particular level of categorical abstraction assigned to objects at the time of initial identi cation Jolicoeur, Gluck, & Kosslyn, 1984 . In response, we consider the predictions of GSD theory relative to the representational properties necessary to explain entry-level recognition. First, there are instances where GSDs will represent di erent entry-level objects as members of the same category e.g., a cow and a horse. Second, there are instances where GSDs will represent the same entry-level objects as members of di erent categories e.g., the three watches shown in Figure 3 . Additionally, Biederman and Gerhardstein's own results indicate that objects that are named as members of the same entry-level category are treated as separate representations by the recognition systems.
Generality of GSD theory Biederman and Gerhardstein 1993 suggest that recognition will be viewpoint i n v ariant s o long as their three conditions for viewpoint i n v ariance are met. However, in their demonstrations of viewpoint i n v ariance it is impossible to di erentiate between GSD theory and recognition by unique features. The limited case of discriminating between only ten or so volumes is atypical of normal recognition conditions, where entry-level classes, let alone individual objects, number in the thousands. Viewpoint i n v ariance may be obtained, but only under conditions in which each member of a stimulus set may be discriminated from all other possible targets by unique viewpoint-invariant image features similar suggestions have been made by Jolicoeur, 1990a , and, Murray, Jolicoeur, McMullen, & Ingleton, 1993 . To be fair, GSD theory is predicated on the assumption that geons project to features that are unique for a given object class among all such classes. Our point is that while such features may appear unique in sets of ten objects, there is no analysis that establishes whether con gurations of non-accidental properties uniquely specify real-world object categories. In fact, Jacobs 1993 concludes that non-accidental properties are not qualitatively di erent from other image features, but rather re ect the geometry of a restricted set of objects occurring in the world. Beyond this set, there exists an in nite class of such properties, with no assurance that the subset of properties enumerated as non-accidental will arise from the objects we recognize e.g., the image features arising from curved objects do not always fall into this subset. Thus, while non-accidental properties are useful in that they do occur in some subset of objects in the world, they are ill-suited as the basis for a theory intended as the exclusive explanation for human recognition performance.
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To illustrate our point, consider an early demonstration of the viewpoint-invariant recognition of novel objects. Eley 1982 had subjects learn and then name up to 20 letter-like two-dimensional symbols. In the naming task, each object was presented at several unfamiliar orientations generated by picture-plane rotations. Crucially, each object was designed so that a small amount of local contour was su cient to di erentiate that item from all other items in the set. For instance, one object contained a small closed loop, while another was composed of an open spiral. Eley observed that subjects' naming times were viewpoint invariant o v er changes in orientation. Based on this result Eley concluded that identi cation is achieved by processes that extract viewpoint-invariant feature information. This conclusion lacks generality because, in the context of discriminating Eley's stimuli from all familiar objects, it is unlikely that a small subset of features, such as the unique contours present i n Eley's stimuli, will support robust recognition particularly because rotations in depth alters which features are visible. Thus, Eley's study provides another example of unique features mediating viewpoint-invariant recognition that does not generalize to normal recognition. Indeed, this simple idea may be used to account for Eley's results, the predicted results of our recognition-by-color Gedanken Experiment, the amelioration of orientation e ects in naming common objects Jolicoeur, 1990a; Murray et al., 1993 , and, most importantly, results cited in support of GSD theory Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993 . In particular, no appeal to the recovery of geons is necessary for more detailed discussions about such feature-based mechanisms in viewpoint-invariant recognition, see B ultho & Edelman, 1993; Cave & Kosslyn, 1993; Edelman, 1991; Jolicoeur, 1990a. Strong tests of viewpoint i n v ariance beyond incorporating unique features into each object or class must involve stimuli that either: 1 are selected so as to minimize the likelihood of a small subset of features shape, color, etc. being diagnostic within that restricted stimulus set, or 2 are sampled from the set of all possible objects so as to be adequately representative of the distribution of features present i n t ypical recognition conditions. Because it is unclear what an adequate sampling of objects would be, and, because of the possibility that multiple views may h a v e already been acquired for familiar objects thereby masking potential e ects of viewpoint, researchers have often chosen to use the rst method, that of intentionally employing novel stimulus objects designed so as to minimize the diagnosticity of any simple features B ultho & Edelman, 1992; Humphrey & Khan, 1992; Tarr & Pinker, 1989 . In all studies employing such controls, viewpoint-dependent performance has been consistently obtained.
Current evidence on object recognition
Evaluating alternative accounts of viewpoint-dependent recognition performance. Biederman and Gerhardstein 1993; also, Biederman & Cooper, 1992 propose that viewpointdependent performance could be the result of the in uence of non-recognition" mechanisms. Speci cally, they suggest that visual recognition is viewpoint i n v ariant, but that processes that are precursors to motor interaction with the object extract metrically-speci c information that is viewpoint dependent. Because of the possibility that such non-recognition mechanisms contaminate otherwise viewpoint-invariant recognition performance, they claim that there is an asymmetry in what can be concluded from viewpoint-invariant patterns of performance as compared to viewpoint-dependent patterns. Unfortunately, this line of reasoning is unfalsi able in that any result inconsistent with GSD theory, e.g., viewpointdependent recognition performance, is attributed to non-recognition systems. A method independent o f b e h a vioral measures must be used to establish whether viewpoint-dependent recognition performance is caused by non-recognition systems. Therefore, until otherwise proven, cognitive mechanisms that in uence performance in recognition tasks must be considered part of the recognition process.
The possibility of non-recognition systems in uencing recognition might be addressed by using non-behaviorally-based evidence on dissociations in the visual system, for example, the distinction between the ventral and dorsal cortical vision systems Goodale & Milner, 1992; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982 . It is the ventral dorsal distinction that has been used by Biederman and Gerhardstein 1993 as the basis for mapping viewpoint i n v ariance to recognition mechanisms and viewpoint dependence to non-recognition mechanisms. However, while there are well-documented dissociations between the ventral and dorsal systems for recognition and grasping Goodale et al., 1994 , there is no clear justi cation for extending the division to include e ects of viewpoint in recognition. While ventral stream processing has been shown to mediate recognition, it has not been shown to be exclusively viewpoint i n v ariant. To be clear, our point is not that there is no evidence for a distinction between cortical processing streams. Rather, our reasoning concerns how relevant this distinction is for understanding e ects of viewpoint in object recognition. At present, there is no speci c data, neuropsychological or otherwise, that dorsal stream processing underlies viewpoint-dependent performance in recognition tasks. Moreover, even if this were shown to be the case, it would still remain to be established whether dorsal stream processing plays no role in recognition or, in fact, mediates some, if not most, recognition judgments.
A second alternative i n terpretation of viewpoint-dependent recognition performance is based on the argument that e ects of viewpoint are a consequence of the particular psychophysical task used to assess recognition. At the most general level we believe that there is no single task that perfectly re ects visually perceiving and recognizing an object where often there is no overt response. Therefore, there is no a priori reason to discount the results of one type of recognition task over others. It is, however, possible that some experimental paradigms prompt the use of viewpoint-dependent strategies that are not normally used in everyday recognition. For example, a strong distinction has been made between tasks that assess explicit and implicit memory Schacter, 1987 , and some intriguing dissociations in performance across transformations of size and mirror re ection have been found between implicit and explicit tasks Biederman & Cooper, 1991 Cooper, Schacter, Ballesteros, & Moore, 1992 . Biederman and Gerhardstein draw on these dissociations in their speculation that old-new recognition judgments an explicit task are controlled by feelings of familiarity" of both ventral and dorsal origin, but that naming an implicit task is in uenced only by v entral processing. They go on to suggest that recogni-tion is best assessed by paradigms designed to reduce the reliance on feelings of familiarity" p. 1163. What is unknown is the contribution of implicit and explicit processing in everyday recognition. Indeed, intuition suggests that objects are routinely recognized using both kinds of knowledge. There is no basis for claiming that naming is a more appropriate measure of recognition. Furthermore, there are several reasons why naming may be a less direct and less valid measure of recognition performance as compared to other tasks: naming requires post-recognition lexical access, a process that may increase the variance associated with responses, and naming may result in the application of imposed categorical boundaries as a byproduct of our restricted lexicon and or conceptual organization. Thus, even when objects are encoded as distinct representations, other task-relevant cognitive constraints may mask such di erences.
Viewpoint-dependent e ects in the recognition of novel objects. While there does appear to be a dissociation between implicit and explicit tasks for transformations across object size and re ection, the dissociation breaks down when assessing e ects of viewpoint. In the recognition of novel objects across both picture-plane and depth rotations, both implicit and explicit tasks have resulted in viewpoint-dependent performance B ultho & Edelman, 1992; Humphrey & Khan, 1992; Srinivas, 1993 . There have been several studies Jolicoeur, 1985; Tarr, in press; Tarr & Pinker, 1989 that employed naming, yet still revealed systematic e ects of viewpoint. For example, Tarr's studies used a naming judgment and controlled for possible lexical di erences by using novel names for each n o v el object. These studies also controlled for several other alternative explanations for viewpoint dependency, including the possibility that such performance was the result of reliance on mirror-re ection discrimination or of averaging across viewpoints where parts become visible or occluded.
Tarr and Pinker 1989 investigated the rotation-for-handedness" hypothesis which states that recognition is normally viewpoint i n v ariant, but that discriminations that require distinguishing between mirror-image pairs necessitate the use of viewpoint dependent mechanisms Corballis, 1988; Hint o n & P arsons, 1981; Takano, 1989 . Biederman and Gerhardstein revive this explanation by arguing that the objects used in several studies may have prompted a strategy of using left-right, viewer-centered information, for example, information that a given part was on the right side. Such a strategy would lose invariance over mirror-image re ection..." p. 1166. However, this possibility w as addressed by exper-iments using either 2D stick gures rotated in the picture-plane 3 Tarr & Pinker, 1989 or 3D connected-cube objects rotated in depth Tarr, 1989, in press . Several methods were employed to ensure that discriminating between mirror-re ections was irrelevant to the recognition task, for instance, by including both members of a either a 2D or 3D mirror-image pair and treating these as equivalent o r b y using one of several sets of bilaterally symmetrical 3D objects. Even given such controls, these experiments obtained viewpoint-dependent performance in the recognition of novel objects. The experiments employing 3D objects as stimuli Tarr, 1989 also addressed the possibility that viewpoint-dependent patterns are an artifact of averaging across viewpoints where part visibility c hanges. Speci cally, objects were presented at rotational increments spaced closely enough 15 to assess whether performance varied within the viewpoint range encompassed by a single GSD. Response times patterns were analyzed separately for individual objects in terms of the change in visible parts and the change in image features across rotations in depth. However, for both asymmetrical and symmetrical connected-cube stimuli, systematic e ects of viewpoint w ere obtained regardless of whether the GSD changed or not. Additionally, viewpoint-dependent performance independent of the change in visible parts has recently been replicated by T arr and Chawarski 1993 with 12 objects composed of geons and illustrated in Figure 1 . 4 3 Hummel and Biederman's 1992 neural net model provides a possible explanation for the picture-plane rotation e ects found in some recognition studies Jolicoeur, 1985 . However, three characteristics of the picture-plane rotation e ects found in Pinker's 1989, 1990 studies indicate that they cannot be explained by this model. First, Tarr and Pinker found no evidence for a response time dip" at 180 . Second, while e ects of misorientation in Jolicoeur's 1985 experiments diminished rapidly, sometimes disappearing entirely after only a single presentation Murray et al., 1993 , the e ects of misorientation in Tarr and Pinker's experiments diminished only slowly, with repeated presentations. Third, the model is incapable of discriminating between the stimuli used in any o f T arr and Pinker's studies, therefore, it cannot provide an account of the mechanisms used to recognize such objects. The crucial di erence may be that Jolicoeur used familiar objects, thereby facilitating the extraction of orientation-invariant unique features. In contrast, Tarr and Pinker's novel stick gures were designed speci cally to prevent this strategy. 4 It should be noted that monotonic viewpoint-dependent e ects are predicted by a model in which perceivers are sensitive only to quantitative changes in the image. However, Tarr & Kriegman 1992 have recently presented evidence that perceivers are also sensitive t o qualitative changes across rotations in depth. While a similar prediction is made by GSD theory, i t w as observed that performance discontinuities were predicted by con gurations of image features that do not specify geons, but are elements of Koenderink and van Doorn's 1979 theory of object representation. Tarr and Kriegman speculated that qualitative changes in these features may used to de ne the viewpoint boundaries between nodes in a multiple-views representation.
One result that appears inconsistent with the demonstration of viewpoint dependency within a single GSD is that recognition of some novel three-dimensional objects similar to those in Figure 1 has been found to be immediately viewpoint i n v ariant Experiment 3 , Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993 . It was observed that rotations in depth that do not produce changes in the GSD do not result in increased recognition times or errors. This is precisely the e ect that GSD theory is intended to explain. However, when a rotation produced changes in the visible parts, performance was viewpoint dependent, with increased response times and errors. GSD theory o ers no mechanism to explain how subjects were able to recognize that di erent GSDs speci ed the same object. In contrast, the multiple-views approach posits that a normalization procedure is used to align the unfamiliar view with a familiar view Ullman, 1989 . Indeed, the response time cost obtained in the part-change condition is consistent with the empirical signature of normalization processes. The putative rate of rotation as measured by the slope of the response time function across viewpoint w as 459 s comparable in magnitude to the rates found in many studies of viewpoint-dependent recognition and classic" mental rotation studies. In comparison, Tarr in press obtained rates before extensive practice as fast as 469 s for recognition and S. Shepard & D. Metzler 1988 obtained a rate of 343 s for handedness judgments. 5 The fact that Biederman and Gerhardstein obtained viewpoint-dependent performance comparable to that found in many other studies actually strengthens the hypothesis that viewpoint-dependent mechanisms are used in object recognition. Moreover, these results indicate that similar e ects of viewpoint obtained in other experiments employing novel objects B ultho & Edelman, 1992; Humphrey & Khan, 1992; Tarr, in press; Tarr & Pinker, 1989 should be taken seriously as evidence for multiple-views.
Viewpoint-dependent e ects in the recognition of novel objects following ex-5 Contrary to Biederman and Gerhardstein's claim that recognizing visually similar objects is atrocious," the error rates obtained in studies demonstrating viewpoint dependence are also lower than or comparable to the error rates obtained in experiments demonstrating viewpoint i n v ariance. For example, using novel connected-cube objects trained in one viewpoint, Tarr in press obtained error rates before extensive practice of between 4-13 for identical views and between 6-20 for 130 depth rotations around the vertical axis. For tube-like objects, B ultho and Edelman 1992 obtained rates of between 5-10 for identical views and between 5-30 for depth rotations of 15-90 around the vertical axis. In comparison, for familiar common objects, Biederman and Gerhardstein 1993 obtained initial error rates of between 3-11. For novel objects similar to those in Figure 1 , the error rate was at oor 0 when the same image features were visible after rotation, but was 24 when the image features changed.
tensive practice. The viewpoint-invariant recognition of familiar objects can not be used as direct support for viewpoint-invariant representations because multiple-views theory proposes that familiar objects are encoded as multiple viewpoint-speci c representations. Consequently, while Biederman and Gerhardstein's claim of an asymmetry in interpreting e ects of viewpoint is problematic, there is an asymmetry in the opposite direction for interpreting viewpoint-invariant e ects for the following reasons: First, near-equivalent performance may result from multiple views that are distributed so as to minimize the e ects of any normalization process Jolicoeur, 1985 Jolicoeur, , 1990a Ullman, 1989; Tarr, in press; Tarr & Pinker, 1989 . Second, viewpoint-invariant patterns may be attributed to viewpoint-dependent representations that are matched via normalization procedures that do not scale in processing time with the magnitude of the transformation one-shot" transformations; B ultho , Edelman, & T arr, 1994.
Tarr's studies Tarr, 1989, in press; Tarr & Chawarski, 1993; Tarr & Pinker, 1989 were designed to investigate whether familiar objects were represented as multiple-views or as a viewpoint-invariant structural-descriptions. In order to ensure that subjects had no prior knowledge of the stimuli, they were taught to recognize novel objects from speci c viewpoints selected by the experimenter. This design allows a crucial manipulation: following extensive practice in recognizing each object, the same objects are displayed at unfamiliar viewpoints interspersed between the now-familiar viewpoints. The results of over ten experiments using this manipulation were essentially identical: response times and error rates for naming a familiar object in an unfamiliar viewpoint increased with rotation distance between the unfamiliar viewpoint and the nearest familiar viewpoint. As mentioned previously, v ariations on this paradigm excluded the possibilities that this pattern was the result of spurious left-right discriminations or averaging across viewpoints where parts become occluded or revealed. Thus, this systematic pattern strongly supports the multiple-views theory and indicates that the now-familiar objects were recognized by learning each familiar viewpoint and then normalizing unfamiliar viewpoints to those views.
These speci c patterns of performance are di cult to account for with any theory other than multiple-views. Such results however do not indicate that human object recognition is exclusively viewpoint dependent. Rather, they indicate that, as objects become increasingly similar across both parts and spatial relations as when the objects in Figure 1a and 1b are combined, recognition becomes progressively reliant on viewpoint-dependent mechanisms a hypothesis tested in Edelman, 1992; Tarr & Chawarski, 1993; Tarr & Pinker, 1990 . Such a thesis is consistent with other work in the eld of object recognition B ultho & Edelman, 1992; and with recent replications of viewpoint-dependent recognition in monkeys Logothetis, Pauls, B ultho , & Poggio, 1994 using the same tube-like objects employed in studies with humans B ultho & Edelman, 1992 . This is the only empirically grounded account o f h o w subordinate-level recognition, such as discriminating a particular model of car, is accomplished. Indeed, simulations of GSD theory are incapable of discriminating between objects that share parts, for example, the similar object pairs across Figures 1a and 1b . Therefore, GSD theory cannot provide an account of successful subordinate-level recognition.
Nevertheless, Biederman and Gerhardstein 1993 propose that only a tiny proportion of the subordinate-level classi cations that people make" p. 1181 are accomplished through viewpoint-dependent mechanisms. They argue that distinguishing among highly similar exemplars is typically mediated by attending to viewpoint-invariant contrasts. However, a wide range of studies requiring subjects to distinguish between objects sharing similar parts and spatial relations have repeatedly revealed viewpoint-dependent performance for example, discriminating between the objects shown in Figure 1 . Therefore, to the extent that such tasks are considered representative of real-world subordinate-level discriminations, Biederman and Gerhardstein's claims are not supported by the empirical data. Invariant features may play a role when recognition below the entry-level category is not exemplarspeci c, but rather categorical, as in Biederman and Shi rar's 1987 study of discrimination of sex in chicks. However, when discriminating chicks as individuals categorical features will not su ce and viewpoint-dependent mechanisms will be used. The hypothesis that viewpoint-dependent mechanisms mediate discriminations in which objects are similar is also consistent with the interpretation of results for Experiment 3 of Biederman and Gerhardstein. In this experiment, small e ects of viewpoint w ere obtained even when the visible features remained constant across rotations. They suggest that greater object similarity leads to greater costs or additional processing" for changes in viewpoint. Such claims reinforce the characterization of subordinate-level recognition as discriminating between objects sharing similar features in similar spatial relationships.
Viewpoint-dependent e ects in the recognition of familiar common objects.
Because common objects have been seen from many viewpoints, multiple-views theory does not predict large e ects of viewpoint across rotations in depth. Biederman and Gerhardstein disregard this fact in their Experiments 1 and 2 which are designed to test incorrectly viewpoint-dependent and viewpoint-invariant models of recognition of common objects. They assessed the impact of rotation in depth on the entry-level naming of familiar common objects. Stimuli were displayed at one viewpoint, then displayed later at either the same viewpoint or one of several new viewpoints. Both experiments revealed that the initial presentation of an object led to decreased response times for subsequent presentations of the identical object with only small costs for changes in viewpoint. In contrast, response times for subsequent presentations of a di erent object drawn from the same category were somewhat slower, indicating that independent o f a n y priming for generating the category name, some exemplar-speci c visual priming did occur. While the amount of visual priming was systematically dependent on the magnitude of the rotation, the putative rate of rotation was considered too fast to be the result of viewpoint-dependent mechanisms; consequently, it was concluded that viewpoint-invariant representations must mediate any facilitation in naming. However, if a multiple-views representation of a familiar object is distributed across a set of views, then no normalization is necessary and a large e ect of viewpoint will not be obtained Jolicoeur, 1985; Tarr & Pinker, 1989 . While priming a view will primarily lead to facilitation of only that view, other views will not be recognized through normalization procedures unless they are far from any familiar view. Consequently, in Biederman and Gerhardstein's experiments any e ect of viewpoint from primed to unprimed viewpoints will not be comparable to the rates of rotation observed in studies where viewpoint familiarity was controlled and the recognition of unfamiliar views was then tested B ultho & Edelman, 1992; Tarr, in press. We i n v estigated the possibility of small systematic e ects of viewpoint in Biederman and Gerhardstein's Experiments 1 and 2 by computing the magnitude of priming for familiar exemplars as compared to unfamiliar exemplars at each viewpoint which provides a baseline to control for the fact that di erent viewpoints may inherently yield di erent response latencies, Palmer, Rosch, & Chase, 1981 . As shown in Figure 2 , in the Experiment 1 there was a small trend towards monotonically decreasing priming with increasing change in viewpoint. 6 In the Experiment 2 there was a much larger and more systematic decrease in priming with increasing change in viewpoint almost to oor at the greatest rotation. While these e ects may appear small in absolute terms, relative to the speed of naming familiar exemplars they actually vary from approximately 2 to 10.
The fact that systematic viewpoint-dependent priming e ects were obtained in object naming is inconsistent with Biederman and Gerhardstein's condition which predicts viewpoint i n v ariance as long as there is no change in the visible geons. Speci cally, this condition predicts strong priming for all viewpoints in which the same parts are visible and signi cantly reduced priming for all viewpoints in which di erent parts are visible see Experiment 3 o f Biederman & Gerhardstein. However, the pattern of priming may be graded if one assumes that it varies with the number of features that are common to adjacent GSDs. For example, because the central component of each object will remain visible across all rotations around the vertical axis, some priming is possible regardless of the other di erences between GSDs. Thus it is possible that the GSD approach could potentially accommodate this viewpointdependent priming pattern. On the other hand, such extensions raise new issues, for example, whether each feature change as measured by a di erence in priming gives rise to an entirely new GSD, and how di erent GSDs for the same object are related to one another. What is certain is that the priming pattern is entirely consistent with multiple-views approaches B ultho & Edelman, 1993; Poggio & Edelman, 1990; in press that predict performance will be dependent on the viewpoint disparity b e t w een primed and unprimed views. While no claims are being made for an exclusive role for multiple-views mechanisms, our analysis indicates that the original assumptions used to interpret the pattern of priming across depth rotations do not take i n to account this class of viewpoint-dependent theories.
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Even given the potential for multiple views of familiar common objects giving rise to apparent viewpoint-invariant performance, there is some evidence that viewpoint-dependent mechanisms are used in the recognition of familiar objects Bartram, 1974; Humphrey & Khan, 1992; Jolicoeur, 1985 Jolicoeur, , 1990a Srinivas, 1993 . For instance, Palmer et al. 1981 demonstrated that most common objects have a preferred canonical" view. They found that objects were named most rapidly in the canonical viewpoint and that naming latencies increased with increasing depth rotation away from this viewpoint. This pattern of responses is consistent with a multiple-views theory, if, for example, one posits that the canonical viewpoint is the preferential view in memory as in Tarr, in press. Thus, until non-canonical views become familiar, they are recognized by a normalization to the canonical view. In contrast, these results are at present unaccounted for in GSD theory. First, there is no mechanism for preferential access to one GSD over all others for a given object with the exception of accidental views, all viewpoints should lead to immediate GSD representations. Second, because distinct GSDs for each con guration of parts are hypothesized to be viewpoint i n v ariant, the systematic relationship between rotation from canonicality and naming latencies cannot be accommodated without appealing viewpoint-dependent generalization procedures.
Explanatory power for entry-level recognition
GSD theory is an account o f entry-level recognition, that is, the rst category label that comes to mind when one encounters an object Jolicoeur, et. al., 1984 . The explanatory power of the theory is to be found in the claim that GSDs are qualitative descriptions of objects, and as such, most members of a given entry-level category should give rise to the same GSD. Consequently, the recognition of a new exemplar of familiar entry-level category is achieved because the GSD recovered from the image will closely match the encoded category GSD. To provide an adequate explanation at this level, GSDs must satisfy the criterion of sensitivity and stability Marr & Nishihara, 1978 that is, the representation must be sensitive enough to di erentiate the variation that occurs between objects considered dissimilar, yet stable enough to encompass the variation that occurs within objects considered similar. Neither condition is generally satis ed by the GSD approach.
Sensitivity. A theory of entry-level recognition should assign di erent descriptions to members of di erent e n try-level categories. The neural-net simulation of GSD theory carried out by Hummel and Biederman 1992 includes instances where this requirement is not satis ed. For example, the model relies on primitives that are so coarse and few in number that they would fail to di erentiate between a cow and a horse, between a book and a note-pad, or a pen and a piece of wire. While such examples may be more di cult than some entry-level discriminations, for instance, between a chair and a duck, any viable theory of object recognition should be able to account for both types of performance. There are also experiments that indicate that GSD theory is overly stable under some circumstances. For example, GSD theory treats all of the di erent wire-form" objects used in Rock and Di Vita's 1987 experiments as equivalent. Consistent with Biederman and Gerhardstein's 1993 second condition that objects to be di erentiated must have di erent GSDs, Rock and Di Vita found that subjects were poor at recognizing wire-form objects when rotated in depth. However, Farah, Rochlin, and Klein 1994 demonstrated that recognition was signi cantly improved when smooth surfaces were interpolated along each wire-form. Such objects cannot be represented by GSDs any more than the original wire-form objects, yet recognition accuracy changed. This di erence in performance across object types indicates that image features, not geons, mediated subjects' ability to compensate for variations in viewpoint.
Stability. A theory of entry-level recognition should also assign the same description to members of the same entry-level category. There are many instances where GSD theory fails to satisfy this requirement. For example, di erent GSDs will be recovered for each o f the three watches shown in Figure 3 , and as such, each should be recognized as a distinct entry-level category. In fact, all three watches are actually members of the same entry-level category. Such instances are relatively common: other examples include square and round tables, and Volvos and Porsches. To accommodate such phenomena, GSD theory must either include parts su ciently coarse to encompass qualitative c hanges in shape, thereby becoming more stable, or posit multiple di erent GSDs corresponding to a single entry-level category. In the former case, many dissimilar classes would be lumped together, resulting in a representation that is not sensitive enough to di erentiate between many objects that are members of di erent categories. In the latter case, there is no principled basis for determining why distinct GSDs should be included or excluded from a given entry-level class, thereby resulting in a theory of object recognition based on conceptual rather than perceptual factors. Such a theory is unlikely in that empirical work provides evidence that perceptual factors mediate performance in entry-level object naming tasks. Speci cally, Biederman and Gerhardstein 1993 observed that studied exemplars of a entry-level category were named faster than unstudied exemplars which w ere presumed to give rise to di erent GSDs. Such results indicate that geon descriptions are overly sensitive with regard to the entry-level and therefore GSD theory must adopt a many-to-one mapping in which di erent perceptual object representations correspond to a single conceptual category.
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Without any such ad hoc mappings, exemplar-based multiple-views theories B ultho & Edelman, 1993 predict that priming should be speci c to an exemplar, rather than to all members of the class. The reasons for this prediction are based on the fact that multipleviews representations are the result of many instances of objects from each e n try-level class. Each known exemplar contributes activation energy associated with its speci c features to the overall pattern of activation in the representation. When a novel exemplar of familiar class is observed, feature similarity will determine its match to a view. Within that viewpointspeci c representation, activation will be relatively higher for the features associated with that exemplar, and, consequently, responses to a repeated presentation of that item will be facilitated over all dissimilar exemplars.
In contrast, in accounting for entry-level performance, GSD theory must assume that a given entry-level class corresponds either to a single qualitative representation or to multiple discrete representations that are conceptually de ned as similar. In the former case, when a novel exemplar of a familiar class is observed, the GSD, which m ust be qualitatively identical to that of the familiar class, will determine its class membership. Thus, activation should be higher for the representation of all members of an entry-level category, not the speci c exemplar by de nition, GSD theory is based on entry-level recognition being achieved via all members of a category giving rise to the same representation. Consequently, responses to a second presentation of any member of a given class should be facilitated. In the experiments reviewed above, the visual priming e ect does not follow this pattern: sensitivity t o di erences among members of the same entry-level category was obtained, while insensitivity to such di erences is the cornerstone of the GSD approach. 7 In the latter case, the GSD will not be recognized at the entry-level, but at the GSD-level" a level of representation posited arbitrarily on the basis of the theory itself.
In contrast, exemplar-based multiple-views theories may be able to account for the recog-nition of new exemplars of familiar entry-level categories. The basis for this claim is that characterizations of viewpoint-dependent theories as templates are misleading in that exact shape is not an inherent property o f s u c h models. In particular, evidence cited in support of the multiple-views hypothesis speaks primarily to the viewpoint speci city of the representation, not to the nature of the shape tokens within each view. Moreover, recent computational models of viewpoint-speci c exemplar-based learning are actually quite robust in the recognition of new exemplars of familiar categories. Such models use multi-dimensional feature interpolation, whereby a subset of exemplars in a class may be su cient for synthesizing new members of that class Poggio & Edelman, 1990 . This approach has been used successfully in computer graphics to generate large sets of cartoon drawings Librande, 1992 and faces Beymer, 1993 . Thus, while multiple-views theories have been implicated primarily in subordinate-level classi cation tasks, they may also provide an account o f e n try-level recognition.
Conclusions: What mechanisms are used to recognize an object?
While a great deal of this discussion has focused on clarifying what we see as the important role of viewpoint-dependent mechanisms and representations in human object recognition, we wish to emphasize that we are not by a n y means advocating an exclusively viewpointdependent account. Indeed, Tarr and Pinker 1989; Tarr, 1989 , in press have i n v estigated the conditions under which immediate viewpoint i n v ariance is obtained with novel objects, B ultho and Edelman 1993 have e n umerated some of the computational constraints that may determine whether viewpoint-dependent or viewpoint-invariant mechanisms are used, and Tarr and Kriegman 1992 have examined the e ect of qualitative c hanges in image structure on the perception of viewpoint. Consistent with this approach, we propose that human object recognition may be thought o f a s a c o n tinuum in which the most extreme exemplar-speci c discriminations recruit exclusively viewpoint-dependent mechanisms, while the most extreme categorizations recruit exclusively viewpoint-invariant mechanisms Figure 4. This hypothesis is not unique : Edelman 1991 , Farah 1992 , and Jolicoeur 1990a , among others, have h ypothesized that recognition is mediated by at least two mechanisms, the application of each being determined by task, context, familiarity, and visual similarity to other known objects.
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What remains an open question is where GSD theory of human object recognition falls along this continuum. Given Biederman and Gerhardstein's demonstrations of viewpoint invariance it would be tempting to associate GSD theory with the viewpoint-invariant effects that occur in some recognition judgments. However, our analysis indicates that this conclusion is problematic. To summarize:
Generality. The conditions proposed for obtaining viewpoint i n v ariance do not characterize everyday object recognition. What these conditions de ne is an instance of recognition by unique features. Moreover, there is little evidence to indicate that the features specifying geons remain unique under typical recognition conditions or beyond demonstrations using only a restricted set of objects.
Current evidence. GSD theory is inconsistent with the wide range of studies that nd viewpoint-dependent recognition performance. There are currently no well-grounded reasons to discount viewpoint-dependent recognition e ects as arising from non-recognition systems or experimental artifacts. Moreover, demonstrations of viewpoint i n v ariance using familiar common objects necessarily fail to distinguish between previously learned multiple-views and viewpoint-invariant structural-descriptions. In contrast, there are many speci c results that are explained by m ultiple-views, but not GSD theory.
Explanatory power. GSD theory does not provide an account o f e n try-level recognition. In some cases, GSD theory represents di erent e n try-level items as the same object, in other cases it represents the same entry-level items as di erent objects. Biederman and Gerhardstein's results indicate that di erent exemplars of the same entry-level category are encoded as distinct representations. As a consequence of these incompatibilities, GSD theory o ers a level of explanation that is arbitrarily de ned by the theory. By way of comparison, we h a v e reviewed evidence that clearly supports the hypothesis that viewpoint-dependent mechanisms, and speci cally multiple-views, are fundamental to human object recognition. To summarize:
Viewpoint-dependent performance has been obtained in studies that control for unique features, explicit familiarity, and possible mirror-image confusions. These studies are often characterized by stimulus sets in which objects having similar shape must be discriminated from one another conditions that are highly analogous to those found in real-world subordinate-level recognition tasks.
Viewpoint-dependent performance has been obtained in studies employing familiar common objects as stimuli. These e ects cannot be accounted for purely on the basis of averaging across qualitative c hanges in visible features or parts.
While viewpoint-dependent performance is diagnostic for inferring viewpoint-dependent mechanisms, there is an asymmetry in what can be concluded from viewpoint-invariant performance. Viewpoint-invariance may be due to previously encoded multiple views, to unique features in a restricted set, or to one-shot" normalization procedures.
We conclude that multiple-views mechanisms play a signi cant role in the continuum ranging from exemplar-speci c discriminations to categorical recognition. While there are many examples of viewpoint dependency in discriminating between visually similar objects, there are also many examples of viewpoint dependency in entry-level tasks. Thus, whether we are discriminating between a Porsche 928 and a Mazda RX7 or are recognizing either model as a car, the task may crucially involve m ultiple-views representations matched to percepts through viewpoint-dependent normalization mechanisms. Recognition discriminations using only these objects are predicted to be immediately viewpoint i n v ariant. If the sets are combined, no simple con guration of features is likely to be unique. In this instance, recognition requires not only knowledge of the parts, but the metric spatial relations between them, therefore recognition is predicted to be viewpoint dependent objects adapted from Tarr & Chawarski, 1993. Figure 2. Estimated priming for the second presentation of objects as a function of viewpoint c hange estimates were made from plotted results of Experiments 1 and 2, Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993. The priming e ect was computed by subtracting the mean naming times for same exemplar objects from the mean naming times for di erent exemplar objects. This measures the advantage in naming speed observed for a particular exemplar of an object that was seen previously. Figure 3 . The top two objects are members of the same entry-level category watch", yet give rise to di erent GSDs. The bottom watch i s a n o v el exemplar of the same entrylevel category, but will result in yet another GSD. Thus, GSD theory cannot account for how unfamiliar exemplars of familiar entry-level categories are recognized. In contrast, exemplarbased theories that posit multiple views can account for this performance through multipledimensional feature interpolation Librande, 1992; Poggio & Edelman, 1990. Figure 4. Object recognition may be considered as a continuum in which there is a tradeo between e ciency of representation and e ciency of recognition. The most extreme categorical tasks, for instance the recognition of classes de ned by unique features not necessarily GSDs, may be accomplished through viewpoint-invariant mechanisms. In contrast, the most extreme within-class discriminations, for instance discriminations between objects of similar shape and spatial relations, may be accomplished through viewpoint-dependent mechanisms. The association of viewpoint-invariant mechanisms with categorical discriminations and viewpoint-dependent mechanisms with exemplar-speci c discriminations is supported by the experimental tasks that produce each pattern of behavior. Similar continuums have been proposed by Edelman 1991 and Farah 1992 . 
